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Abstract 
The paper presents and discusses a case which shows the possibility of employing the results of 
theoretical research (namely some of the concepts elaborated by Claudio Ciborra in his “The 
Labyrinths of Information”) in changing human resources management and development, in fostering 
organizational learning, and in building an ICT management coherent with business goals.  
BAnCO (194 employees) is a supplier of outsourced ICT services for Italian regional and 
interregional banks which changed its ‘netsourcing’ business model (services rendered to a 
consortium of small client-owner banks of the ICT supplying company) to an ‘enterprise partnership’ 
business model, based on servicing both the client investors and external customers. To support the 
change in strategy, at the end of 1999 it launched a program that deeply innovated performance 
management (substituting the appraisal based on absolute judgment rating scales to one based on 
action plans), training activities (traditional classroom work was integrated by personalized, diffused 
learning centered on the evaluation of the competence requirements of roles), and communication and 
knowledge management (key competences were defined and up-dated through interaction between in-
house experts and outside experts in the ICT and banking fields). The three main sections of the paper 
are devoted: (i) to illustrate the theoretical background explaining both Ciborra’s approach and the 
traits that in his view characterize an effectively managed organization dealing with ICT; (ii) to 
describe in depth the main areas addressed by the BAnCO program, how project work was conducted, 
and the outputs produced; (iii) to discuss the case and to comment on the results obtained. 
In sum, far from being a ‘model’ or a ‘guide’, Ciborra’s outlook seems to carry helpful “operational” 
indications when looking for ways to change business-as-usual for more effective and dynamic 
conducts. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The case presented shows the possibility of employing the results of theoretical research (namely some 
of Ciborra’s concepts, Ciborra 2002) in changing human resources management and development, 
fostering organizational learning, and building an ICT management coherent with business objectives. 
The case (named BAnCO) was chosen because of the abundance of the sources of evidence (Yin 
2003): explicit firm business model, original change program objectives, project support (guides for 
interviews, number and roles of people involved, number and duration of sub-projects team work, 
interim reports), an analytic operational guide to implant change management, and documents 
concerning implementation and results. Besides this brief introduction, the paper is divided into three 
sections: the first one outlines the theoretical background that supports the emblematic character of the 
case; the second one describes the case. The final part contains the discussion of the case and the 
concluding remarks. 
2 THE THEORETICAL BACKGROUND. 
Though rooted in the years sixties dispute on the “computational model of the mind” (Dreyfus 1992), 
the research on the limits of approaches based on centralized planning and control to ICTs  
management developed in the mid-nineties. In those years the necessity and difficulty of aligning large 
IS infrastructures to corporate strategy became a point of discussion (Chan and Reich 2007) together 
with the very failure of a number of ISs. In fact, the large investments involved focused the attention 
of top management, practitioners, and scholars on the effectiveness of the projects (and of the 
methodologies employed). On the whole, the above mentioned conception of the mind has worked as 
a background not only on artificial intelligence issues but also on how IS projects and ICT firms 
should be run, especially in orientating human resources management on both ‘producer’ and ‘user’ 
sides and on their interactions. Should organization design and IS design be considered mainly rational 
endeavors within a means-ends and linear causal chain approach, the explanations concerning 
unsatisfactory IS performance or even failure would reside in the “looseness” of plans and of control 
systems. As a matter of fact, the software engineering discipline has acknowledged that more attention 
should be paid to socio-technical issues (Boehm 2006) so that increasing complexity of large systems 
can be better governed.  
Within this research area, Claudio Ciborra (2002) developed the basic traits of a different IS 
management theory starting from his criticism of natural sciences models applied to the IS domain (to 
be considered a hybrid discipline instead). Such traits (‘commitments’ in Ciborra’s wording) include 
the following four ones (which, together with the concept of ‘hospitality’ discussed later on, constitute 
the theoretical pivots to interpret the BAnCO case): (i) the ability to rapidly change perspective in 
addressing a certain issue (“to switch Gestalt” in Ciborra’s terms); (ii) the aptitude to manage 
ambiguity (this is how his heed to “saying ‘yes’ and ‘no’ simultaneously to technology” can be 
interpreted); (iii) the capacity of sensing responsibility also within unpredictable events or outcomes of 
actions; (iv) the  propensity to value certain activities considered marginal (e.g. tinkering) or even 
barely tolerated contributions (e.g. improvisation) by usual IS management approaches. The four 
features that have just been mentioned are part of his commentary to Heidegger’s The Question 
Concerning Technology (Heidegger 1993) contained in the fourth chapter of The Labyrinths of 
Information (Ciborra 2002). His recourse to phenomenology in research, as he openly claims, allows 
him to overcome the dominance of a consolidated tradition which does not show to possess an 
effective heuristic value: 
 “Either we do what management science suggests, that is, idealize … or we keep on putting 
into brackets what we believe we know about strategy, structure, markets, feedback 
mechanisms, stage curves, and so on, and reflect upon what we observe. We accept 
coexistence with the messiness of the worldly routines and surprises without panicking” 
(Ciborra 2002: 26) 
The point Ciborra is making concerns the approach to be adopted to improve IS effectiveness and 
decrease failure risk coping with real IS projects, IS vendors, outsourcers organizations, and IS 
departments. One possibility is that top management and consultants keep relying (basically) on 
formalized abstractions thus preparing sophisticated maps and plans, introducing them into the 
organizational structure, and forcing new routines in the behavior of IS middle management and  
personnel (expecting control systems to signal anomalies, non-conformities, and to orientate conduct). 
It is an unsatisfactory approach because it ignores a number of risks which derive from standardization 
and integration: “digital organizations are simultaneously more controlled and more unpredictable” 
(Ciborra 2004:13). The reason is that both clients and vendors are affected when IS projects are 
launched and implemented (of course, the more significant the project the more substantial the effect): 
within the former the new IS interacts with the organization creating new forms of cooperation among 
users and units; within the latter the very process of defining users requirements, negotiating them 
with the client and discussing the ‘solution’ with development people (Cheng and Atlee 2007) implies 
the questioning of present routines that might result unsuitable for the oncoming project; furthermore, 
new development tools and development collaboration technologies (Whitehead 2007) promote 
change and organizational destructuring and learning. The scenario around 2010 and over (Boehm 
2006) is one of global connectivity (with emerging problems such as cultural mismatching in products 
and processes) and of huge ‘systems of systems’ bearing risks connected with the integration of 
systems developed independently, rapidly evolving because of changing needs of numerous 
stakeholders that have to be coordinated. Thus, software dependability probably will be increasingly 
problematic:  
“Given the high and increasing software vulnerabilities of the world’s current financial, 
transportation, communications, energy distribution, medical, and emergency services 
infrastructures, it is highly likely that such a software-induced catastrophe will occur between 
now and 2025.” (Boehm   2006:20 italics added; the author refers to a “software-induced 
systems catastrophe similar in impact on world consciousness to the 9/11 World Trade Center 
catastrophe”) 
Of course, these warnings do not belong to a “luddite” strand (Boehm is the well known father of the 
‘spiral model’) so that different views should be considered and more attention paid, as Ciborra 
suggests, to listening to managers and to their dealings with ‘surprising’, unstructured events, and to 
their opportunistic adjustments. The intent is to try and  reconstruct the real routines that they use so 
that a process of reflection can be started on the part of the actors involved, and novelties (born both in 
the internal and external environments of the organization) can be detected and may foster not only 
‘single’ but also ‘double loop learning’ (Argyris and Schön 1978) so that consequences of actions can 
affect a deep and continuous rethinking of both operations and strategy. Increased flexibility and 
resilience of IS organizations can thus more probably induce systems improvement (including their 
dependability). 
Ciborra’s legacy, then, is twofold: on the one hand it highlights the problems connected to the 
adoption of reductionist (sequential) models when trying to catch up with a fast changing world - one 
of the consequences of  modernity according to Giddens (1990) as Ciborra recalls - or to understand 
(and leverage) the nuances of personalities and emotions involved in working activities. On the other 
hand, there are some broad concepts, the four traits of the IS managerial theory mentioned above, 
which constitute beacons when managing (riding) the evolution of organizations. Those four 
capabilities belong to a general disposition of ‘hospitality’, a term employed by Ciborra when 
describing the attitude of an organization towards emerging ideas, contributions, and unexpected 
events or consequences to planned actions. This attitude allows the parties involved in the construction 
of an IS to consider it as an open ended process. And to act accordingly. In fact, ‘hospitality’ does not 
imply a sense of unconditioned acceptance of the “guest”. Rather, in its original meaning, it 
presupposes alertness towards the “newcomer” who could turn out to be (or could become) an 
“enemy” (Ciborra 2002:111). Therefore, the metaphor favors ‘inclusiveness’ but it conditions it to the 
‘viability’ of the interplay of the different parties involved in a certain IS project, e.g.: top 
management, in-house ICT technicians, outsourcing services companies, end users and whoever else 
can significantly contribute to the project. It also favors the “openness” of the organization to 
(selected) stimuli coming from both interior and outside environment. Any obstacle to such viability 
should be considered detrimental to the effectiveness of the specific IS artifact or service. Vice versa, 
it should be expected that when these principles are employed in managing ICT projects, better results 
are obtained. 
There are several contributions that show appreciation when considering Ciborra’s research work (for 
example Avegrou, Hanseth, Willcocks 2006) and his suggestions (specifically on ‘hospitality’: 
Brigham and Introna 2006, and Saccol and Reinhard 2006). But to the best of our knowledge there is 
no evidence in the literature of cases where an explicit IS organizational learning (OL) strategy can be 
considered to be coherent with Ciborra’s approach. The description, interpretation and discussion of 
such cases could help reflection on its advantages, viability (resources employed), and persistence. 
That is in what way ‘hospitality’ (and the four ‘commitments’ connected to it) can be harnessed by an 
organization (including the conditions for their stability). This is the research question that will be 
discussed in the light of the results of the BAnCO case. 
3 THE CASE: BANKING APPLICATIONS OUTSOURCING (BANCO) 
The case study describes how a deep change in human resources management and communication 
(fuelled by CEO involvement and a diffused leadership supported by team work) helped a supplier of 
outsourced ICT services in the banking industry develop its outsourcing philosophy and market.  
The supplier changed its ‘netsourcing’ business model (services rendered to a consortium of small 
banks client-owners of the ICT supplying company) to an ‘enterprise partnership’ business model, 
based on both servicing the client-investors and external customers. One advantage of presenting this 
case is its belonging to a well searched area (outsourcing). The reference work (Willcocks and Lacity 
2006) that has been used to identify the above mentioned BAnCO business models also contains the 
definition of twelve supplier capabilities (Feeny, Lacity, and Willcocks 2006) of which seven can be 
detected as a top priority in the change program concerning human resources and communication 
management (they are listed in paragraph 3.2) 
3.1 Characteristics of BAnCO. 
Established in 1991 by a consortium of ten local (regional and interregional) Italian banks deeply 
rooted in their small and medium sized enterprises clientele, BAnCO was launched with the purpose 
of outsourcing ICT functions considered to be too costly to be run effectively in-house by each single 
bank. Its main role was to provide application and facility management through the analysis of needs, 
application selection and customization for each member bank, running the applications by keeping 
anomalies and costs at a minimum. In 1999 both anomalies and costs were higher than expected and 
relationships with vendors difficult (on-going claims and contracts re-negotiations). Thus the client-
owners decided that a through change was needed: they wanted quality to improve and costs to be 
reduced. They would invest to better quality so that new clients could be acquired and fixed costs be 
spread on a wider number of banks: the business model was to evolve from ‘netsourcing’ to 
‘enterprise partnership’: other local banks would choose BAnCO because of his specific domain 
expertise and (being a local supplier) for extra control and attention (Willcocks and Lacity 2006:16). 
New CEO and deputy CEO were appointed to carry out the change strategy.  
3.2 A key factor in the management of change: integrating performance management, 
competence development and knowledge based communication 
At the end of 1999 top management decided to hire a few key people, to reposition some of the middle 
managers (30 people in total) and to engage management consultants to help renovate culture and 
systems dedicated to human resources (HR) management and development (BAnCO totaled 194 
people). In the ‘setting’ phase (two months), the structure of the program was developed through the 
interaction of top management, the two managing directors (‘systems development’ and ‘operations’), 
middle management, the HR function, and the consultants.  
The general goals that were pursued can be summarized in the strengthening of the following seven 
capabilities (Feeny, Lacity, and Willcocks 2006: 101-111): (i) domain expertise, “the capability to 
apply and retain sufficient professional knowledge of the process domain to meet user requirements” 
(banking, of course); (ii) behavior management, “the capability to motivate and manage people to 
deliver service with a ‘front office’ mind set”; (iii) technology exploitation, “the capability to swiftly 
and effectively deploy technology in support of critical service improvement targets”; (iv) process 
improvement, “the capability to design and implement changes to the service process to meet 
improvement targets”; (v) customer development, “the capability to transition users from an internally 
provided service to costumers who make informed decisions about service levels, functionality, and 
costs” (vi) organization design, “the capability to deliver the necessary resources, wherever and 
whenever they are needed to achieve the business plan”; (vii) leadership, “the capability to identify, 
communicate, and deliver the balance of activities required to achieve present and future success, for 
both client and provider”. The reason why they have been used to explain the intents of BAnCO is 
threefold: (a) since they were defined within an international research that lasted several years, the 
case can be situated in a wider empirical framework; (b) they fit (of course) the intention and purpose 
of the firm that can be detected in the official papers and project documents; and (c) the way the 
authors define some of them is conceptually close to Ciborra’s perspective. For example (op. cit. p. 
106), the ‘customer development capability’ entails “Establishing … precursors of trust and personal 
relationships.” and “Enactment of a business relationship in which the client feels able to meet 
changing needs of the business over time”. However, since there is also the need to produce a “formal 
definition and communication of service required”, the capability of managing ‘ambiguity’ is also 
necessary: saying yes and no simultaneously to both formalization and trust. 
Having set the goals, the issue was to evaluate the perceived strengths and weaknesses together with 
the “real” values, which actually orientated actions, compared to the “official” ones. They were 
collated in a top-down, bottom-up approach: (i) top-down: consultants prepared a guide for the 
interviews (actually a discussion outline twenty pages long) which had been previously discussed with 
(and approved by) top management; (ii) bottom-up: two hours long meetings (on key issues 
concerning clients, projects and the current HR systems and knowledge development) with each 
middle manager followed; (iii) a report was then prepared and decisions taken concerning the specific 
objectives to be pursued, the composition of teams that were to develop  the new systems and tools 
(with consultants acting as facilitators), and the outline of the following three phases (design, 
implementation and revision, and operation). The overall duration from start up (from ‘setting’ to 
‘revision’) was expected to last one year (which it actually did).  
This first phase dedicated to BAnCO assessment was particularly important because it compared top 
management views of the organization, the so-called picture from ‘high ground’ (Ciborra 2002:89), 
with the perception, views, fears, hopes, and skepticism of middle management. As a consequence, the 
newly appointed top managers increased their awareness of “what goes on in the (daily) swamp of 
actual projects” (Ciborra 2002:90) and the change management program improved its viability. 
The following four sections describe the main areas of concern of the program that were developed 
parallel and the outputs produced.  
3.3 Performance Management: from rating scales to action plans 
The previous performance management (PM) system was centered on a performance appraisal based 
on an absolute judgment rating scale considering different performance areas. In the opinion of the 
vast majority of supervisors, the main draw back of that system was its remoteness from operations 
and, during the five years of its existence, it had become increasingly a bureaucratic task to be 
performed without any substantial benefit neither for supervisors nor for employees. The point was not 
to “improve the rating scale” by adding some new ‘areas’ or ‘dimensions’ but to dispense with it all 
together inventing another kind of solution. The idea (“the shift of Gestalt” Ciborra would say) was to 
base the new performance management system on the elaboration of action plans. The manager of 
each organizational unit would explain and negotiate with her supervisor the objectives that had to be 
pursued for the following year. The inputs for the action plans were the general objectives pursued by 
BAnCO expressed by top management and interpreted by the supervisor that discussed them in a 
preliminary meeting with his collaborator. Each management level negotiated the action plan prepared 
by the units of the lower level so that an overall coherency could be reached. In fact action plans were 
to be prepared also by people that did not have the responsibility of a ‘unit’ (it was named Employee 
Action Plan). 
This solution was considered viable because: (i) BAnCO was rather ‘flat’ (3 management levels); (ii) 
the structure of the action plan was lean (five sections: perceived firm overall priorities, specific goals 
of the unit/person, actions to pursue them, critical issues, unit/person capabilities development policy); 
(iii) it could be compiled according to individual managerial styles, to personal preferences, and of 
course to the specific characteristics of the unit, rather than adhering to an abstract analytic standard 
draft. Furthermore, it favored constant engagement between supervisors and employees so that gaps 
(between objectives and results, problems and solutions) could be managed and possibly avoided. 
Another point of strength was that part of the action plan was to explain how individual competences 
could be improved by promoting self assessment and awareness. At the end of the year the ‘official’ 
performance appraisal was to be conducted on the evaluation of the (positive or negative) gaps that 
could be observed, and the ‘pay for performance’ part of the compensation could be established. Of 
course, several other ‘informal’ appraisal meetings and discussions were held during the year to check 
for ‘drift’ in the projects that were launched with individual client banks; as a matter of fact, the intent 
of the ‘action plan’ was primarily to support operations, dialogue, reflection of individuals and 
resilience of the project team to emerging problems or opportunities stemming from news concerning 
other possible vendors or emerging technologies, development techniques, prospective banking 
regulations. Appraisal as such was just a consequence of what had been managed (and mismanaged) 
all along, and thus it wasn’t a “surprise” (a pop-up test). 
3.4 From classroom training to personalized, diffused learning 
Class-room training and (some) job rotation were the previous ways of improving capabilities. A 
member of the HR function gathered the perceived needs from top management and compared them 
with vendors offerings; some negotiations with a few pro-active middle managers finalized the list of 
courses and of participants. From the point of view of the participants “being chose to participate to a 
course” was either perceived as a “bonus” or as a “punishment” and not really as a professional 
development. Given this situation, the in-house ‘capabilities team’ and the consultants proposed (and 
then actually carried out) a change in approach.  First a list of 29 competences was drawn: they were 
considered to be relevant (in different degrees) for anyone working for the “new” BAnCO. They were 
grouped into three major competence areas: ICT, banking business and organization, and ‘service’. 
The last one included managerial competences for running an effective performance management 
(actually for running effective operations). The term adopted highlighted the concept that supervisors 
were “serving” employees by orienting their work and professional development and, vice versa, 
employees “served” as proactive proponents and actors; the two groups together where “serving” both 
clients and BAnCO to reach their goals (the outsourcer’s capabilities enhanced were: ‘behavior 
management’ and ‘customer development’). One major change in mentality was to consider any 
request or claim or problem encountered in the interaction with a customer as one’s own 
responsibility, no matter how surprising and unforeseen was the request and not directly included in 
one’s task (this relates to improving the capability ‘organization design’). During the second step the 
descriptions of roles were revised so that they would: (i) be coherent with the new philosophy of  
BAnCO; (ii) be less analytic, more easily interpreted by people, and used as a guideline for preparing 
(evaluating) action plans; (iii) contain a profile of capabilities considered to be important to handle 
each work position. In the third step the self-assessed (but discussed with supervisors) individual 
competence profiles were collated so that the competence gaps could be appraised, at the individual, 
organizational unit, and company level. In the fourth step the ‘capabilities team’ and the HR function 
defined the development actions which included, but were not limited to, classroom work; in fact, they 
also comprised small informal interest groups, ‘didactic’ participation to projects, ‘hot-line’ with in-
house experts and other initiatives (top-down or bottom-up proposals) that would be coordinated by 
the HR function. 
3.5 Communication and knowledge 
Communication in BAnCO used to be considered a “natural” activity carried out spontaneously by 
managers in their interaction with employees; interchange was limited to problem solving or to 
interfunctional meetings (often in the presence of vendors or clients or both). The main shortcoming 
was considered by the majority of managers to be the large number of ineffective meetings (often 
judged to be non finalized rituals or personal show-offs). Consequently, the team in charge of  
outlining criteria for ‘communication and knowledge management’ developed the following strategy 
on this topic: meetings were to be considered vehicles for knowledge building and sharing (potentially 
part of HR development activities) so that the person(s) calling a meeting should define (and 
communicate to participants): contributors, objectives, duration and key points for the interaction with 
the “outside guests” (vendors and clients). Another crucial issue addressed by the team concerned how 
to keep BAnCO open to innovation taking place in banking and ICT so that the list of the 29 BAnCO 
competences that represented its know-how (drafted by the previously mentioned specific team) could 
be kept updated together with the competence profiles of the company roles; to this end, a list of 
knowledge sources was compiled (e.g.: state of the art vendors, universities, regulatory institutions) 
and matched with a list of in-house experts so that innovation could be monitored and distributed. This 
activity was to reinforce ‘domain expertise’ and ‘technology exploitation’ capabilities. 
3.6 From design to operations 
The analyses conducted, the solutions proposed, and the operation guidelines drafted by the in-house 
teams and the consultants during their four months work were discussed with top management and 
presented during a convention to the two hundred BAnCO employees at the end of June 2000. The 
convention was the start up date of the first implementation phase (six months) whereby action plans 
were negotiated, people competence profiles drafted, activities to overcome gaps started. Training on 
the new performance methods were conducted and a calendar of follow-up activities established: 
consultants held meetings on call to help management and the HR function clarify emerging issues 
and manage situations that were change resistant (because of misunderstanding, misinformation, or 
fear of power loss). 
Only minor revisions were necessary after the first trial phase so that the integrated system to manage  
performance, capabilities, and communication kept on running beyond January 1, 2001. 
4  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The four capabilities outlined by Ciborra (2002) can be found in both the management of the project 
and the characteristics of the changes that were introduced. For example: (i) the ‘new sense of 
responsibility’ can be found in the change of attitude towards a non task oriented behavior that opens 
to unexpected requests from clients; (ii) managing ambiguity (saying yes and no simultaneously) is 
certainly an ability needed in developing action plans and negotiating them (on the part of both 
supervisor and employees), lest they become useless formal and static documents; (iii) improvisation 
and tinkering are certainly needed in managing action plans to keep abreast with clients requests or 
with emerging anomalies or vendor claims; (iv) rapid change in perspective is necessary when trying 
to grasp opportunities and innovation from research centers presentations (coupled with openness to 
valuing tinkering: “let’s see how this solution can be useful to solve that nuisance…”). Furthermore, 
‘hospitality’ seems to be the general attitude to be adopted (the basic capability) in dealing with 
change and innovation: being open to ‘serve’ (to host) new ideas and proposals but being alert in 
dealing with them to find out when they could become draw backs and hinder the overall development 
of the organization and of the business. In this respect, for example, each client-owner had to be 
treated in his double role: that of an opportunity creator when presenting challenges versus that of a 
threat originator when trying to engage resources at his exclusive benefit.  
The following table synthesizes the theoretical pivots of the case study (some of the ‘commitments’ 
that Ciborra considered vital for a new ‘tack’ in IS management), it exemplifies some of the activities 
of the BAnCO project which appear to be coherent with such commitments, and it identifies some of 
the capabilities which were pursued through the activities to be performed. 
 
Ciborra’s IS managerial 
‘commitments’ 
Examples from BAnCO program 
activities 
Supplier capabilities  
(Feeny, Lacity, and Willcocks 2006) 
Change perspective 
rapidly 
Informal appraisal meetings; 
Definition of internal and external 
knowledge sources; 
Design and up-dating of 
competence profiles; 
Dispensing with rating scales in 
PM; 
... 
Domain expertise; 
Organization design 
Manage ambiguity Diffused learning (interest groups); 
Connecting in-house experts to 
outside experts; 
Knowledge sharing meetings with 
vendors and clients; 
... 
Behavior management; 
Technology exploitation 
Sense responsibility in 
uncertainty 
Constant engagement between 
supervisors and employees; 
Self assessment of individual 
competences (and discussion with 
supervisor); 
... 
Customer development 
Value marginal 
contributions 
BAnCO assessment based on top 
and middle management deep 
involvement (top-down, bottom-
up); 
Employee Action Plans; 
... 
Process improvement 
‘Hospitality’ Performance Management based on 
action plans; 
... 
Leadership 
Table 1. A synthetic view of activities performed by BAnCO in the Human Resources and 
Communication Management project considered with respect to pursued 
‘Commitments’ and ‘Capabilities 
 
Two caveats should be born in mind: 
• the success of the change program was obtained in an organization that grew on the new principles 
and guidelines across the board so that each individual project (and person) benefited from the 
positive general attitude. Such principles could be less effective when applied to individual 
projects without an overall ‘coherency’. In other words the effectiveness of these concepts (and 
techniques) is felt more in the general management of an organization rather than in an isolated 
project. 
• on the whole it is difficult to tell how much of the expansion of BAnCO that started with the 
introduction of the new HR management and development system was a consequence of it. 
Certainly though, top management, the majority of  middle management and of employees 
considered it to be a success. One last remark emphasizes the pivotal role of CEOs especially in 
“soft variables” based change management. After two years of running of the system the CEO left 
BAnCO for personal reasons. The new (end of career, well known, “no nonsense” kind of 
managerial attitude) CEO decided to terminate the program and to reintroduce traditional rating 
scales in the performance appraisal, thus dispensing with action plans and competence profiles.  
In sum, Ciborra’s outlook seems to carry helpful “operational” indications when looking for ways to 
change business-as-usual for more effective and dynamic conducts, towards a convergence of ‘vision’ 
and ‘mission’, of techniques and strategies to an ever changing ICT business environment. The term 
‘operational’ was in quotes to avoid a possible misunderstanding on the existence of a Ciborra model 
for organizational learning and change. Given his efforts to criticize ossifying practices and idealistic 
generalizations, in his case a model would amount to an oxymoron. 
Certainly, the principles of his approach are not at odds with some OL features and practice: for 
example, the need for a ‘blame-free culture’ and that of ‘supportive atmosphere’ (for a non IS specific 
review, see Denton 1998) which can be considered to be close, respectively, to Ciborra’s underscoring 
of ‘responsibility’ and ‘valuing marginal areas’ to nurture experimentation and innovation. However, 
the concepts highlighted in the paragraph on the theoretical background of the paper show samples of 
a closely knit and variegated research tissue, an outlook, an ever expanding toolkit of images, 
critiques, incursions into difficult (yet necessary) philosophical grounds developed by Ciborra in his 
work which do not outline a baedeker for human resources (or organization) departments and 
consultants. Rather, it is a corner stone (which can be very practical and operational as the case has 
shown) for anyone willing to be aware of the subtleties involved in system development which 
appears to be closely intertwined with people development. And undertake action accordingly. 
References. 
 
Argyris, C. and Schön, D. (1978) Organizational learning: A theory of action perspective, Reading, 
Mass: Addison Wesley. 
Avgerou, C., Hanseth O., and Willcocks, L. (eds.) (2006). Special Issue: Claudio Ciborra and the IS 
Field: Legacy and Development. Journal of Information Technology, Vol. 21, No. 3, September 
Boehm, B. (2006). A View of 20th and 21st Century Software Engineering. Proceedings of the 28th 
International Conference on Software Engineering, Shanghai. ACM 
Brigham, M. And Introna, L.D. (2006). Hospitality, improvisation and Gestell: a phenomenology of 
mobile information. Journal of Information Technology, Vol. 21, No. 3, September 
Chan Y.E. and Reich, B.H. (2007). IT alignment: what have we learned?. Journal of Information 
Technology, vol. 22, No. 4 December 
Cheng, B.H.C. and J.M.Atlee (2007). Research Directions in Requirements Engineering. International 
Conference on Software Engineering on the Future of Software Engineering, IEEE 
Ciborra, C. (2004). Digital Technologies and the Duality of Risk. Discussion Paper no: 27. LSE 
October 
Ciborra, C. (2002). The Labyrinths of Information. Challenging the Wisdom of Systems. Oxford 
University Press. Oxford. 
Dreyfus, H.L. (1992). What Computers Still Can’t Do – A Critique of Artificial Reason. London, The 
MIT Press. 
Feeny D., Lacity M., and Willcocks L. (2006). Assessing 12 supplier capabilities. In Willcocks L.P., 
Lacity M.C.  “Global Sourcing of Business and IT Services”. Palgrave Macmillan. New York. 
N.Y. 
Giddens, A. (1990). The Consequences of Modernity. Stanford University Press. Stanford California 
Heidegger, M. (1993) The Question Concerning Technology. In Krell, D.F. (ed.) Basic Writings. 
Routledge. 
Saccol, A.Z. and Reihard, N. (2006). The Hospitality Metaphor as a theoretical lens for understanding 
the ICT adoption process. Journal of Information Technology, Vol. 21, No. 3, September 
Whitehead, J. (2007) Collaboration in Software Engineering: A Roadmap. International Conference on 
Software Engineering on the Future of Software Engineering, IEEE. 
Willcocks L.P., Lacity M.C. (2006). Global Sourcing of Business and IT Services. Palgrave 
Macmillan. New York. N.Y. 
Yin, R.K. (2003). Case Study Research. Sage Publications. Thousand Oaks. California. 
